My interview with Celso Albelo, tenor making his debut at the Royal Opera is live on musicalcriticism.com! You can find it here.
Check it out!
Check it out!
03 November, 2011
27 October, 2011
A Note on Noam
Noam Chomsky needs no introduction. At the recent International State Crime Initiative's launch of their new journal, State Crime, Chomsky waxed eloquently for about an hour on the "Changing Contours of World Order," a talk that essentially followed the outlines of his recent Al-Jazeera article (you can read it here), but conspicuously lacked any significant discussion of the recent riots in London or--perhaps more importantly--the recent "Occupy" protests. Although Chomsky gave his speech before the worldwide protests began on the 15th of October, one wonders whether or not his credibility suffered a little by not philosophizing on such an important matter. I was going to summarize his talk but considering that the majority of what he said was lifted out of his AJ article, I'll explore my opinion of his short but fascinating lecture (that's the disclaimer).
Chomsky's presentation style is super dry; it largely consists of regurgitating of facts that he claims are freely available to any one who wants to "dig through the archives" to find them. I have no problem taking him seriously: as an American living abroad I think it's hugely important to remember that countries and, more broadly, the nation-state (especially the US) are constructions that continually affect our daily lives, both in ways that are obvious and in ways we cannot possibly know, which may indeed be the central problem lurking behind the majority of Chomsky's arguments.
Much of Chomsky's talk explored the ideological motivation behind the previous sixty years of US foreign policy; essentially, he interprets State Department documents, media coverage, intellectual commentary, etc. from a perspective that sees consolidation of government power, both domestic and international, as its chief enterprise. Chomsky wouldn't agree, but I see this perspective to be quite similar to the arguments Foucault makes about power/knowledge, save the fact that Chomsky clearly believes in humanity's supposedly inherent sense of morality. When the riots did come up during question time, and someone asked what could be done about American hegemony and the crimes of a complicit world, he suggested that the we hold those responsible accountable by banding together in a decentralized way to govern ourselves (not particularly surprising from an anarchist), relying on our morality to do so.
This is a great suggestion, however difficult it may be. One need only look to the "Occupy" protests to see the grudgingly labored manifesto they have produced to confirm that this sort of democracy is indeed possible. But what I find inherently improbable about his suggestion and its implied decentralizated governance is the reconciliation of obviously varying moralities that it would require, a necessary requirement if Chomsky claims there is an ideal morality against which to gauge variations.
This is why decentralized governance cannot work in the real world, unfortunately. Still, his talk was both eye-opening and riveting.
Chomsky's presentation style is super dry; it largely consists of regurgitating of facts that he claims are freely available to any one who wants to "dig through the archives" to find them. I have no problem taking him seriously: as an American living abroad I think it's hugely important to remember that countries and, more broadly, the nation-state (especially the US) are constructions that continually affect our daily lives, both in ways that are obvious and in ways we cannot possibly know, which may indeed be the central problem lurking behind the majority of Chomsky's arguments.
Much of Chomsky's talk explored the ideological motivation behind the previous sixty years of US foreign policy; essentially, he interprets State Department documents, media coverage, intellectual commentary, etc. from a perspective that sees consolidation of government power, both domestic and international, as its chief enterprise. Chomsky wouldn't agree, but I see this perspective to be quite similar to the arguments Foucault makes about power/knowledge, save the fact that Chomsky clearly believes in humanity's supposedly inherent sense of morality. When the riots did come up during question time, and someone asked what could be done about American hegemony and the crimes of a complicit world, he suggested that the we hold those responsible accountable by banding together in a decentralized way to govern ourselves (not particularly surprising from an anarchist), relying on our morality to do so.
This is a great suggestion, however difficult it may be. One need only look to the "Occupy" protests to see the grudgingly labored manifesto they have produced to confirm that this sort of democracy is indeed possible. But what I find inherently improbable about his suggestion and its implied decentralizated governance is the reconciliation of obviously varying moralities that it would require, a necessary requirement if Chomsky claims there is an ideal morality against which to gauge variations.
This is why decentralized governance cannot work in the real world, unfortunately. Still, his talk was both eye-opening and riveting.
23 October, 2011
Mozart at the Barbican
My review of the Mozart concert at the Barbican:
http://www.musicalcriticism.com/concerts/barbican-crouch-end-mozart-1011.shtml
It was a nice (amateur) concert.
http://www.musicalcriticism.com/concerts/barbican-crouch-end-mozart-1011.shtml
It was a nice (amateur) concert.
16 October, 2011
New Reviews on MusicalCriticism.com!
Check out these two reviews I wrote for musicalcriticism.com!
Rossini Arias:
http://www.musicalcriticism.com/recordings/cd-feast-1011.shtml
Handel's Alexander's Feast
http://musicalcriticism.com/recordings/cd-lezhneva-1011.shtml
Keep watching the site for more of my stuff.
Noam Chomsky lecture review coming soon!
Rossini Arias:
http://www.musicalcriticism.com/recordings/cd-feast-1011.shtml
Handel's Alexander's Feast
http://musicalcriticism.com/recordings/cd-lezhneva-1011.shtml
Keep watching the site for more of my stuff.
Noam Chomsky lecture review coming soon!
04 October, 2011
Update
More writing coming soon: some short stories, a few essays, and some short musings. Currently working on two reviews for musicalcriticism.com.
Sorry for the lapse!
Sorry for the lapse!
27 May, 2011
Terry Gillam's (Berlioz's) The Damnation of Faust
My title says it all. This evening, I saw Berlioz's The Damnation of Faust (La damnation de Faust), sung in English, in a new production by director Terry Gilliam at ENO. I've not heard the music before and being a HUGE fan of Symphonie Fantasique just had to go see it!
I admit that I'm not familiar with (most of) Terry Gilliam's films, so I was really looking forward to the production since I was very much on terra incognita. After all, it's not often that a professional musician gets to hear music that s/he is not already familiar with. I will admit that I am also a fan of the Faust story generally, whether (Werther? ha ha) Goethe's, Marlowe's, or Gounoud's (which I saw earlier this year, also at ENO), I think the general topoi of the redemption of man, good vs. evil, and sin are (of course) best explored in opera, so I was stoked.
Perhaps I shouldn't have had such high expectations. I wont say that it was a let down, but I'll admit, for a Berlioz/opera lover, I was a little bored. On the one hand, the production itself was great: a sumptuous feast for the eyes that was visually stunning! Terry Gilliam's astoundingly creative influence shined through every detail, however small or large. The attention to the environment--in in terms of both the sets, costumes, and scenes of troop movement--was remarkable. The production was almost too real, a simulacrum of reality and an elusive dreamland impervious to the horrors of Time.
Despite this impressive production, I felt nevertheless that it either distracted from the music in a way that bordered on overbearing or was designed to obscure Berlioz's music because it isn't that great. I don't think it's bad music, and I do believe it can be successfully adapted to the operatic stage (it was written as a 'dramatic legend, something between oratorio and opera), but in this production I'm not sure one would be able to tell, especially not having heard it before. So while I found the production itself to be wonderful, I felt that it failed as an overall dramatic presentation.
Just a few years ago, Gilliam's production would've been highly avant-garde, despite his perhaps unintentional appropriation of historical performance practice. Berlioz's Faust premièred in 1846, when grand opéra--and the Paris Opéra (Opéra-Comique), home and birthplace of the genre--was approaching its zenith. A textbook example of a production that invites comparisons to grand opéra because of its production values as event-theatre, 'epic theatre,' satire, and spectacle would be Gilliam's. Besides these colorful checkmarks, Gilliam also made extensive use of video technology and projectors, placing him at the cutting edge of theatrical machinery used to enhance an audience's opinion of the work. Indeed, the Paris Opéra consistently (due to its huge financial subsidy from the French Government) had backdrops and sets that rivaled those at La Scala, if not surpassed them. 'Deus ex machina' means 'God out of nothing,' a plot device used to save operatic characters from certain death and damnation, often involving elaborate mechanical machinery for which the Paris Opéra spared no expense. The same type of machinery was present at ENO, though I'm not sure it succeeded in fulfilling its role as savoir of the production. Still, Gilliam should receive credit for his perfectionist attention.
I think there is something to be said about the opera itself. After all, shouldn't the music have fought back? At least negated in some way the slowly encroaching noose of the production? Probably. But as a 'dramatic legend,' it was never actually meant to be staged, so the dramatic pacing, musically, is somewhat skewed towards the obvious--Faust is damned (no chance throughout of redemption); Mephistopheles is evil (but for some reason very funny); Marguerite is saved (no development)--at the expense of the abstract. I think the music supports this as well. It is very forgettable music, save one or two moments. Without a moment of approach to an apogee of emotional or intellectual investment, I find it difficult to savor any of the performance. And that is decidedly what this production lacked: drama. A superb narrative! But one without any of that, what I consider to be "true" drama.
Music or drama or any other artistic something should evoke emotion. Yes, I am perpetuating what is perhaps an outdated ideology that relies upon the power of the "work," but seriously: who doesn't expose themselves to art in order to feel, to be moved? This production bordered often on the artificial, it seemed too contrived. I will hate myself for saying this, but it seemed also that the image of the rise of Nazi Germany as allegory for the fall or corruption of man was super stale, almost cliché. The production created a work that was essentially a too-easily-decoded diatribe against the ills of modernity, I think negating any other major message that might be produced by the Faust story set to Berlioz's music. This element was in every scene, and saturated every moment of the opera. Literally from beginning to end. I'm not trying to be high-brow, just honest, since this is my blog. I will admit, however, that the final scene in which Marguerite ascends into heaven from amidst a pile of bodies in a mass grave, the dark moonlight shining down divinely on her eerily pale face, snow "falling" all around, was strikingly beautiful.
I admit that I'm not familiar with (most of) Terry Gilliam's films, so I was really looking forward to the production since I was very much on terra incognita. After all, it's not often that a professional musician gets to hear music that s/he is not already familiar with. I will admit that I am also a fan of the Faust story generally, whether (Werther? ha ha) Goethe's, Marlowe's, or Gounoud's (which I saw earlier this year, also at ENO), I think the general topoi of the redemption of man, good vs. evil, and sin are (of course) best explored in opera, so I was stoked.
Perhaps I shouldn't have had such high expectations. I wont say that it was a let down, but I'll admit, for a Berlioz/opera lover, I was a little bored. On the one hand, the production itself was great: a sumptuous feast for the eyes that was visually stunning! Terry Gilliam's astoundingly creative influence shined through every detail, however small or large. The attention to the environment--in in terms of both the sets, costumes, and scenes of troop movement--was remarkable. The production was almost too real, a simulacrum of reality and an elusive dreamland impervious to the horrors of Time.
Despite this impressive production, I felt nevertheless that it either distracted from the music in a way that bordered on overbearing or was designed to obscure Berlioz's music because it isn't that great. I don't think it's bad music, and I do believe it can be successfully adapted to the operatic stage (it was written as a 'dramatic legend, something between oratorio and opera), but in this production I'm not sure one would be able to tell, especially not having heard it before. So while I found the production itself to be wonderful, I felt that it failed as an overall dramatic presentation.
Just a few years ago, Gilliam's production would've been highly avant-garde, despite his perhaps unintentional appropriation of historical performance practice. Berlioz's Faust premièred in 1846, when grand opéra--and the Paris Opéra (Opéra-Comique), home and birthplace of the genre--was approaching its zenith. A textbook example of a production that invites comparisons to grand opéra because of its production values as event-theatre, 'epic theatre,' satire, and spectacle would be Gilliam's. Besides these colorful checkmarks, Gilliam also made extensive use of video technology and projectors, placing him at the cutting edge of theatrical machinery used to enhance an audience's opinion of the work. Indeed, the Paris Opéra consistently (due to its huge financial subsidy from the French Government) had backdrops and sets that rivaled those at La Scala, if not surpassed them. 'Deus ex machina' means 'God out of nothing,' a plot device used to save operatic characters from certain death and damnation, often involving elaborate mechanical machinery for which the Paris Opéra spared no expense. The same type of machinery was present at ENO, though I'm not sure it succeeded in fulfilling its role as savoir of the production. Still, Gilliam should receive credit for his perfectionist attention.
I think there is something to be said about the opera itself. After all, shouldn't the music have fought back? At least negated in some way the slowly encroaching noose of the production? Probably. But as a 'dramatic legend,' it was never actually meant to be staged, so the dramatic pacing, musically, is somewhat skewed towards the obvious--Faust is damned (no chance throughout of redemption); Mephistopheles is evil (but for some reason very funny); Marguerite is saved (no development)--at the expense of the abstract. I think the music supports this as well. It is very forgettable music, save one or two moments. Without a moment of approach to an apogee of emotional or intellectual investment, I find it difficult to savor any of the performance. And that is decidedly what this production lacked: drama. A superb narrative! But one without any of that, what I consider to be "true" drama.
Music or drama or any other artistic something should evoke emotion. Yes, I am perpetuating what is perhaps an outdated ideology that relies upon the power of the "work," but seriously: who doesn't expose themselves to art in order to feel, to be moved? This production bordered often on the artificial, it seemed too contrived. I will hate myself for saying this, but it seemed also that the image of the rise of Nazi Germany as allegory for the fall or corruption of man was super stale, almost cliché. The production created a work that was essentially a too-easily-decoded diatribe against the ills of modernity, I think negating any other major message that might be produced by the Faust story set to Berlioz's music. This element was in every scene, and saturated every moment of the opera. Literally from beginning to end. I'm not trying to be high-brow, just honest, since this is my blog. I will admit, however, that the final scene in which Marguerite ascends into heaven from amidst a pile of bodies in a mass grave, the dark moonlight shining down divinely on her eerily pale face, snow "falling" all around, was strikingly beautiful.
14 February, 2011
Working Out Foucault
Ha Ha I was wondering if anyone was going to mention Foucault, far more apt for this type of question than Habermas. Katie puts it so well by saying that gyms are a "weird vortex of semi-private culture," and I think Foucault can shed far more light on why her evaluation fits than Habermas can.
First, one can look at the social place of privately owned commercial gyms (as opposed to an at-home gym or equivalent space) and question why they exist in the first place. It isn't just a question of "why do certain activities and not others happen inside gyms?" but rather "why do these types of gyms exist?" A gym like Virgin Active (with its high membership costs, opulent facilities, and well-trained staff) can certainly be said to cater to certain groups and not others while serving multiple purposes besides those directly related to personal health.
But I'm not sure Foucault would care so much about arbitrary Marxist distinctions of class (who does or does not gain entry) since theoretically anyone can do so, which is why, in exploring a question such as this--it's more or less the same with nightclubs--we need to abandon notions of the public/private binary and its baggage. Gyms (this type, anyway) are best thought of in terms of "space," "gaze," and "bodies."
Taking this in stride, its important to remember that gyms do far more than provide a space to do, for example, yoga or weight lifting.
Besides activities directly related to personal health, gyms function as a test, or gauge if you like, of the State's control over the individual. The more obvious answer to the above question would be "Gyms exist to ensure personal health and physical fitness." This is very true, but one surely cannot deny that a healthy population--especially one that can afford a membership to Virgin Active--ensures better economic production from which the State obviously benefits. Much of what is discussed below functions, however subtlety, to support these dual elements of gym existence and their embedded presence within our culture. Similarly, gyms are yet another space that one goes before going home, thus creating a space from which the individual can be monitored and possibly observed.
When at a gym, each body has its own space and function within that space. When you're on the rowing machine, you're rowing, isolating specific muscles and only doing so for a specific about of time. Besides space, then, time is also managed: you are allowed only a certain amount of time rowing. Why? Because you want a workout that maximizes efficiency: the least amount of time for the most amount of action, which ensures that others can do the same. These--in addition to the already mentioned "observation"--are classic techniques of discipline; these are the fundamental elements around which our modern society is constructed that date back to the early 17th century and first appeared in the barracks, hospitals, and finally, schools.
Gyms are part of discourse on personal well-being, which makes them a distinct part of the medical profession from both the applied and academic perspectives. "Working out" is a specific manifestation of bio-power, a set of actions (exercise, yoga, weight-lifting) designed to target specific parts of the body (parts the medical profession suggests must be exercised, and of course, exercised in the right way) which in turn effect individual behavior to the point of internalizing certain social norms and not others.
It doesn't matter that you have "free reign" in determining what exercises you do while working out, the important points here are that A.) you are working out in the first place and B.) any exercise you choose to do has already been selected for you by someone else.
Think of the gym as it exists in "collective conscience," in discourse. Discourse shapes the way we see others and ourselves; this is where "gaze" (in part) comes into the picture. The word “gaze” is in a sense misleading, as it implies that it belongs to a particular someone. But this gaze cannot reside with one person or institution; it is taken as both blind and omnipresent: a means of managing subjects through various institutional spaces, in addition to the subject’s own appropriation of the gaze in the evaluation of her behavior. This is one way that anything that could be called a status quo in terms of behavior is established and communicated. This is largely where ideas of image, ideas of self-worth (those relating to "the self" and to "society"), and generally, ideas of what constitutes "normal" come from. Never mind the fact that "normal" is simply a setting on a washing machine.
All these particulars of gym existence come together at an immediate level--to finally and directly address it as an activity--while actually "doing yoga." The considerations of space and time should be fairly clear here: you do not move outside of your space, and you are in each position for a given time. One aspect of this scenario not mentioned earlier was the position of your position: where in the room you are. I guarantee that wherever you are, you can see the teacher and the teacher can see you (monitoring, observation, and distribution of bodies).
Let's explore gaze and body, though. Try wearing men's clothing while doing yoga; better yet, try being a man in a yoga class. You don't actually have to experience either of these things without immediately sensing that both are somehow "wrong." Why? Because there are standards of expectation communicated and internalized by the social gaze and exacerbated by the male and female gazes. When they are broken, or treaded upon, this is a form of resistance to the type of power exerted at the service of an institution within a managed space. That explains, in part, the feelings of awkwardness or vulnerability.
Taking it further, why do both men and women wear (semi-) sluttish clothing while at gyms yet (usually) avoid anything more than quick glances? The former, to show off: for the alphas it’s very much (and this is perhaps too much of a generalization from my own horizon of expectation, to use a Gadamerian term) about boasting, about attracting some sort of mate (sexual or not). The latter works to maintain proper external standards of decency and modesty while also working in the same way for internal self-image. Think also of the ubiquitous presence of mirrors. Mirrors in this context can act as a metaphor for the entire process as described.
This last point leads me to a fundamental observation about gyms: they are without a doubt areas of complex performativity and therefore exist as spaces where there can be no such thing as privacy. This is not just a comment about gyms, but one concerning the dubious nature of the concept, which is why we left that public/private binary behind. While at the gym, you are constantly performing, internalizing, and projecting specific standards of behavior due to the unique place "gyms" hold within the broader social strata. You are always performing/watching in a manner unique to gyms, even if you were to be completely alone within the space because the "norms" constructed through the various mechanisms discussed above are internalized through those same mechanisms. It's really quite circular. This brings us back to the wider picture and our first question, "Why do gyms exist?" Gyms are a way in which individuals are turned into subjects, docile bodies. Gyms are another means through which power/knowledge works to appropriate, mold, and construct the subject at the will of the State. Without a doubt it is one of those spaces in our society that, whether there are CCTV cameras or not, “you” are being watched and constructed.
This is by no means exhaustive; one could say a great deal about yoga as performance, behavior of betas, or about gyms as centers of sexual activity. In any case, this was such a great break from reading about Cortot.
© Michael Migliore, 2011.
First, one can look at the social place of privately owned commercial gyms (as opposed to an at-home gym or equivalent space) and question why they exist in the first place. It isn't just a question of "why do certain activities and not others happen inside gyms?" but rather "why do these types of gyms exist?" A gym like Virgin Active (with its high membership costs, opulent facilities, and well-trained staff) can certainly be said to cater to certain groups and not others while serving multiple purposes besides those directly related to personal health.
But I'm not sure Foucault would care so much about arbitrary Marxist distinctions of class (who does or does not gain entry) since theoretically anyone can do so, which is why, in exploring a question such as this--it's more or less the same with nightclubs--we need to abandon notions of the public/private binary and its baggage. Gyms (this type, anyway) are best thought of in terms of "space," "gaze," and "bodies."
Taking this in stride, its important to remember that gyms do far more than provide a space to do, for example, yoga or weight lifting.
Besides activities directly related to personal health, gyms function as a test, or gauge if you like, of the State's control over the individual. The more obvious answer to the above question would be "Gyms exist to ensure personal health and physical fitness." This is very true, but one surely cannot deny that a healthy population--especially one that can afford a membership to Virgin Active--ensures better economic production from which the State obviously benefits. Much of what is discussed below functions, however subtlety, to support these dual elements of gym existence and their embedded presence within our culture. Similarly, gyms are yet another space that one goes before going home, thus creating a space from which the individual can be monitored and possibly observed.
When at a gym, each body has its own space and function within that space. When you're on the rowing machine, you're rowing, isolating specific muscles and only doing so for a specific about of time. Besides space, then, time is also managed: you are allowed only a certain amount of time rowing. Why? Because you want a workout that maximizes efficiency: the least amount of time for the most amount of action, which ensures that others can do the same. These--in addition to the already mentioned "observation"--are classic techniques of discipline; these are the fundamental elements around which our modern society is constructed that date back to the early 17th century and first appeared in the barracks, hospitals, and finally, schools.
Gyms are part of discourse on personal well-being, which makes them a distinct part of the medical profession from both the applied and academic perspectives. "Working out" is a specific manifestation of bio-power, a set of actions (exercise, yoga, weight-lifting) designed to target specific parts of the body (parts the medical profession suggests must be exercised, and of course, exercised in the right way) which in turn effect individual behavior to the point of internalizing certain social norms and not others.
It doesn't matter that you have "free reign" in determining what exercises you do while working out, the important points here are that A.) you are working out in the first place and B.) any exercise you choose to do has already been selected for you by someone else.
Think of the gym as it exists in "collective conscience," in discourse. Discourse shapes the way we see others and ourselves; this is where "gaze" (in part) comes into the picture. The word “gaze” is in a sense misleading, as it implies that it belongs to a particular someone. But this gaze cannot reside with one person or institution; it is taken as both blind and omnipresent: a means of managing subjects through various institutional spaces, in addition to the subject’s own appropriation of the gaze in the evaluation of her behavior. This is one way that anything that could be called a status quo in terms of behavior is established and communicated. This is largely where ideas of image, ideas of self-worth (those relating to "the self" and to "society"), and generally, ideas of what constitutes "normal" come from. Never mind the fact that "normal" is simply a setting on a washing machine.
All these particulars of gym existence come together at an immediate level--to finally and directly address it as an activity--while actually "doing yoga." The considerations of space and time should be fairly clear here: you do not move outside of your space, and you are in each position for a given time. One aspect of this scenario not mentioned earlier was the position of your position: where in the room you are. I guarantee that wherever you are, you can see the teacher and the teacher can see you (monitoring, observation, and distribution of bodies).
Let's explore gaze and body, though. Try wearing men's clothing while doing yoga; better yet, try being a man in a yoga class. You don't actually have to experience either of these things without immediately sensing that both are somehow "wrong." Why? Because there are standards of expectation communicated and internalized by the social gaze and exacerbated by the male and female gazes. When they are broken, or treaded upon, this is a form of resistance to the type of power exerted at the service of an institution within a managed space. That explains, in part, the feelings of awkwardness or vulnerability.
Taking it further, why do both men and women wear (semi-) sluttish clothing while at gyms yet (usually) avoid anything more than quick glances? The former, to show off: for the alphas it’s very much (and this is perhaps too much of a generalization from my own horizon of expectation, to use a Gadamerian term) about boasting, about attracting some sort of mate (sexual or not). The latter works to maintain proper external standards of decency and modesty while also working in the same way for internal self-image. Think also of the ubiquitous presence of mirrors. Mirrors in this context can act as a metaphor for the entire process as described.
This last point leads me to a fundamental observation about gyms: they are without a doubt areas of complex performativity and therefore exist as spaces where there can be no such thing as privacy. This is not just a comment about gyms, but one concerning the dubious nature of the concept, which is why we left that public/private binary behind. While at the gym, you are constantly performing, internalizing, and projecting specific standards of behavior due to the unique place "gyms" hold within the broader social strata. You are always performing/watching in a manner unique to gyms, even if you were to be completely alone within the space because the "norms" constructed through the various mechanisms discussed above are internalized through those same mechanisms. It's really quite circular. This brings us back to the wider picture and our first question, "Why do gyms exist?" Gyms are a way in which individuals are turned into subjects, docile bodies. Gyms are another means through which power/knowledge works to appropriate, mold, and construct the subject at the will of the State. Without a doubt it is one of those spaces in our society that, whether there are CCTV cameras or not, “you” are being watched and constructed.
This is by no means exhaustive; one could say a great deal about yoga as performance, behavior of betas, or about gyms as centers of sexual activity. In any case, this was such a great break from reading about Cortot.
© Michael Migliore, 2011.
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